Abstract This paper uses the OECD's global recursive-dynamic general equilibrium model ENVLinkages to examine the mid-term economic consequences and the optimal energy supply mix adjustments of a simultaneous implementation of i) a progressive fossil fuel subsidy reform in emerging and developing economies and ii) a progressive phase out of nuclear energy, mostly affecting OECD countries, China and Russia. The analysis is then transposed in the context of climate change mitigation to depict the corresponding implications for CO2 emissions, to assess the interactions between the two energy policies, and to derive how the associated costs are affected by the different policies. The phase-out scenario projects a nuclear capacity halved by 2035 as compared to the Baseline, corresponding to $120 billion losses in value-added of the nuclear industry for that year. The nuclear phase-out leaves GDP and real household consumption marginally affected in energy importing countries. A multilateral subsidy reform is more likely to affect international fossil fuel prices and alter patterns of global energy use. The fossil fuel subsidy reform, when implemented together with nuclear phase-out, more than offsets negative consequences on household consumption but still leads to a decrease in global CO2 emissions. The combined policies help save the equivalent of current energy consumption in the Middle East. Combining a climate policy, an effective fossil fuel subsidy reform, even with a lower nuclear share in the power mix, brings about multiple benefits to OECD countries which reduce their energy bill and achieve large climate change mitigation at lower cost.
Introduction
In 2009, G20 leaders adopted a declaration to "rationalize and phase out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption". The joint IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank report (2010 and 2011 update) shows that substantial fossil fuel subsidies to end users are in place in non-OECD countries, while (mostly) indirect fuel support occurs in OECD countries. Currently more than half of the subsidies in emerging and developing countries result in under-priced electricity or the burning of more coal and natural gas. The other half favours oil consumption. Phasing out such subsidies can provide environmental gains, not least through lower emissions of greenhouse gases, and potentially also be welfare improving OECD 2012) 1 . As fossil fuel policy reform gains momentum worldwide, it will progressively restore electricity prices that better reflect generating costs, and will reduce reliance on fossil fuels by driving investments towards alternative low-carbon energy technologies.
In parallel, nuclear power may be seen as a bridging and competitive element of the energy mix in the transition towards a decarbonised economy. Following the March 2011 accident at Japan's Fukushima nuclear power station, nuclear power faces significant policy uncertainty in some countries; Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, have decided to cancel license renewals for nuclear power plant operators or are contemplating shutting down nuclear power plants. See Kurosawa and Hagiwara (2012) for an assessment of the consequences of nuclear phaseout in Japan; CDC Climat (2012) and Keppler (2012) discuss the economic consequences for Germany; Bretschger et al. (2012) focus their analysis on the Swiss economy; Bauer et al. (2012) carry out a global assessment.
This paper examines the mid-term economic consequences and the changes in the energy technology mix of a simultaneous implementation of i) a progressive fossil fuel subsidy reform in emerging and developing countries and ii) a progressive global phase out of nuclear energy, affecting mainly OECD countries and Russia with large existing nuclear power capacities, together with China and India, where the prospects for development of newly-built nuclear capacity are by far the largest. The analysis is then transposed in the context of climate change mitigation to depict the corresponding implications for CO 2 emissions, to assess the interactions between the two energy policies, and to derive how the associated costs are affected by the different policies in a stylised setting.
By relying less on fossil fuels on the one hand, notably for electricity generation and to fuel transport vehicles, and less on nuclear power on the other hand, this leaves little room to manoeuvre in transforming the energy mix into a sustainable and low carbon system. The combination of these two policy changes could stimulate a quicker deployment of alternative technologies, including renewables, at moderate costs. This would underline the importance of policy measures to enhance energy savings measures as the main mitigation instrument in the medium-term across the entire spectrum of activities (IEA 2012; Chateau and Magné 2013) . But this situation is complicated by endogenous feedback effects as energy markets are internationally tightly linked and competition occurs among energy sources. Thus, even if these policies occur in different countries, they mutually affect each other and the outcome for the energy system, the economy and the environment are not a priori clear. Potential policy conflicts between a fossil fuel subsidy reform and a nuclear phase-out may arise.
Consequently, an applied numerical assessment is warranted to identify the direct and indirect effects of these policy changes. Indeed, earlier OECD analysis has shown that reforming the fossil-fuel subsidies can in itself be welfare enhancing to the extent these subsidies are inefficient . However, in the absence of yeteconomical alternatives to oil products or coal, natural gas and nuclear energy for power generation, transport fuels and electricity prices to end-users in the countries that undertake this policy reform are likely to increase, thereby leading to an expected reduction in fossil fuel demand. In turn, this reduced demand for fossil fuels would lower global fuel prices, and therefore induce an upward push on fuel demand in (mostly OECD) countries that do not reform their energy policies. The responses of household welfare and the activity levels of productive sectors to changes in energy retail prices as well as other induced price changes consecutive to the reforms are inspected.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the rationale for the analysis and introduces the modelling approach. Section 3 discusses the results of the two energy policies in absence of a climate change mitigation policy, while Section 4 adds climate policy to the mix. Section 5 concludes.
Rationale for the analysis and modelling approach
This section is devoted to the introduction of the modelling strategy, to the presentation of current trends in the energy landscape and to the key policy elements under examination.
The ENV-Linkages modelling framework
It is expected from a theoretical point of view that both policies, on fossil fuel subsidies and nuclear power availability, when taken in isolation, might bring about opposite outcomes, be it on the extent of fossil fuel reliance, on welfare implications or on derived CO 2 emissions. The policies induce various intra-and intersectoral energy fuel competition, in addition to macroeconomic effects. Coal-fired, gas-fired and nuclear power plants compete for electricity generation while all end-users, i.e. production sectors and households, adjust their direct usage of all fossil fuels according to relative price changes. As baseload nuclear-based electricity generation is often one of the cheapest sources of electricity (OECD 2010), phasingout nuclear would likely increase electricity prices relative to fossil-fuel prices. Similarly, reforming the support schemes of fossil fuel consumption is notably motivated by the expected increase in the prices of fossil fuels relative to prices of other primary factors, including capital, labour and natural resources. An applied global computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework is an appropriate analytical framework to draw quantitative conclusions about the sign and magnitude of these opposite effects. This analysis is based on the OECD ENV-Linkages model, a global CGE model featuring recursive dynamics and capital vintages, which has been extensively used to study various impacts of fossil-fuel subsidy reforms Burniaux et al. 2011, the IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank joint report, 2011) . The model version used in this paper has benefited from a major baseline calibration overhaul compared with that contained in the OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 (OECD 2012) , derived with the same simulation tool, in order to reproduce accurately most energy trends from the IEA Current Policies Scenario (IEA 2012) for the period 2011-2035. The modelling framework used for the analysis is briefly described in Supplementary Material; an extensive description of the model can be found in Chateau et al. (2012) .
Representation of the policies
A stepwise procedure is followed to analyse the interactions of a multilateral fossil fuel subsidy reform (referred to as FF Sub) and a progressive, global nuclear power phase-out (Nuke). Each policy element is taken in isolation and then implemented in combination with each other FF (Sub & Nuke). While jointly apprehended, these policies remain largely sequential in nature because of the assumed pace of their respective implementation: the subsidy reform is assumed to take place progressively and terminate in 2020 whereas the bulk of nuclear power plants retirements, driving overall nuclear power capacity down in the absence of replacement, will take place after 2020 even if the policy reform is implemented earlier.
In a further step, some illustrative elements of climate change mitigation policy are factored in to analyse further interactions and changes in relative prices of energy sources with CO 2 pricing schemes.
a. Fossil fuel subsidy reform scenario
Current trends in fossil fuel subsidies
The current trends in fossil fuel subsidies depicted below, and the absence of measures to reduce the heavy reliance on fossil fuels to meet rising energy demand, particularly in emerging and developing countries, provide the foundation of the Baseline scenario. Despite widespread acknowledgement of the benefits of a fossil fuel subsidy reform in terms of economic efficiency, alleviation of trade distortions, equity, energy security, resource conservation or environmental protection, only limited progress towards reform has been made.
2 Some progress was recently made but current levels of subsidization remain high in several countries. In 2011, fossil fuel consumer subsidies in developing and emerging economies totalled USD 523 billion (IEA 2012), while in OECD countries tax expenditures and other measures supporting fossil fuel production and consumption amounted to USD 55-90 billion per annum in recent years (OECD 2013) . Household are the largest beneficiaries of consumption subsidies. More than half of global spending on fossil fuel consumption subsidies concern oil used for personal transportation or residential electricity and natural gas usage. Russia, China and India together accounted for a fifth of the fossil fuel consumer fossil fuel subsidies in emerging and developing countries, representing 73 % of coal subsidies, 21 % of natural gas subsidies, 12 % of oil subsidies and 31 % of electricity subsidies (IEA 2012) (See Supplementary Material). Koplow (2012) reports recent but isolated efforts to revisit these subsidies in countries such as China and India. He points out how changes in G20 reporting definitions render the accounting of current reform efforts unclear. Iran, Indonesia and Mexico have conducted reforms with partial success.
Policy reform
The subsidy removal posited here is assumed to be implemented progressively from 2013 to 2020 in all countries where subsidies are currently in place 3 , eventually leading to total elimination by 2020. Government savings from energy subsidy removal are returned to consumers via lump sum transfers. As mentioned earlier, support for fossil fuel production in OECD countries is not included in this analysis.
b. Nuclear power phase-out scenario
Current trends in power plant constructions
Some of most ambitious plans to build new power plants in coming years are being made by non-OECD countries. Over the next 20 years, only coal-fired electrical capacity is seen to decrease significantly across OECD countries. This is partly due to expected efficiency gains in installed coal power plants, but mostly due to a progressive switch to gas-fired power plants, particularly in the United States which are taking advantage of vast shale gas resources.
The countries experiencing the fastest economic growth and sustained energy needs, including China and India, are currently building considerable amounts of new coal, natural gas and nuclear power capacity. In the IEA New Policies Scenario, China and India combined account for about 60 % of the coal-fired capacity built by 2035 (IEA 2012). As plants currently under construction are shaping future energy capacity, much of the energy system will be locked into a high fossil fuel dependency for several decades to come unless ambitious policies are introduced to reverse such trends.
Nuclear power generation in the Baseline scenario is calibrated to reproduce the IEA Current Policies Scenario of the World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA 2012). Both Baseline and nuclear phase-out global capacities are shown in Fig. 1 . Mid-term projections in both the Baseline and the policy cases take into account detailed existing capacity and planned constructions on a country basis (See Supplementary Material). They are derived from the IAEA Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) database. These profiles reflect the shutdown of nuclear power capacity in Japan in 2011 and nuclear power generation progressively resuming by 2020.
Policy reform
The net installed nuclear power capacity in the Nuclear Phase-Out scenario is determined exogenously. The nuclear power phase-out scenario rests on the assumption that governments decide unilaterally to opt out of nuclear energy 4 . The stylised scenario assumes that current plans for building new nuclear plants are maintained until 2020, but that no new construction plans will be approved afterwards thereafter. Existing plants will serve their economic lifetime and will not be dismantled prematurely. Therefore, differences between Baseline trends and Nuclear Phase-Out scenarios materialize only after 2020. The motivation or rationale for countries to opt out of nuclear is not pre-empted in this analysis, and the simulations are purely meant as hypothetical illustrations of a 'what-if' scenario. The nuclear power phase-out scheme assumes a global implementation for the sake of simplicity.
According to the Nuclear Phase-Out scenario, global capacity still rises significantly in the coming years and will be 30 % higher than current capacity. The Russian nuclear capacity in 2020 is 42 % higher than today's level. China's capacity will quadruple by 2020. These trends reflect Japan's 7.5GW capacity loss after the Fukushima accident. Japan's nuclear power production is assumed to resume progressively by 2020. The trends also reflect German, Swiss and Belgian plans not to replace existing capacity as well as France's decommissioning of the Fessenheim power plant by the end of 2016. Overall, the capacity installed in 2035 is broadly in line with the IEA Low Nuclear Case scenario (IEA 2011, chapter 12) . By 2020, cumulative nuclear power capacity additions across OECD countries represent a quarter of the total projected 100 GW. Remaining additions are built in the BRIICS countries, with China alone representing over half of that new capacity. Nuclear fleet expansion in other countries is negligible. The estimated world nuclear power capacity in the nuclear phase-out scenario reaches about 430 GW in 2020, starting from the current 390 GW, and falls to about 280 GW by 2035, a 55 % reduction compared with the Baseline. Average nuclear capacity factors reflecting WEO 2011 nuclear power generation trends by country are then applied to installed capacities to derive nuclear power production constraints.
3 Effects of fossil fuel subsidy reform and nuclear power phase-out without carbon regulation
Impact on energy use
The multilateral subsidy reform makes fossil fuel energy more expensive to end-users in (mainly non-OECD) countries implementing it. The reduced fossil fuel demand in large countries conducting the reform puts a downward pressure on reference international oil prices by 11 % in 2035. In turn, OECD countries face lower energy prices and increase their consumption of coal and natural gas, albeit moderately. This leakage effect is highlighted in . However, the decrease in fossil-fuel energy demand in non-OECD countries more than offsets the demand stimulus in OECD countries. As such, the overall impact of the reform is an international price decrease of all fossil fuels, relative to Baseline levels, and an expected reduction in fossil fuel consumption globally (Fig. 2) . In the absence of incentives to move away from fossil fuels (e.g. through carbon taxes or enhanced support to the deployment of renewable energy), the reduced reliance on nuclear energy in the Nuke scenario is the source of extra fossil fuel use to produce electricity. Coal and natural gas substitute for nuclear power in countries where nuclear capacity grows significantly under Baseline conditions, i.e. China, India, Russia, South Korea and the United States.
When both policies are conducted in parallel, and without carbon regulation, interaction effects are small and both effects are almost additive. The impact of the fossil fuel subsidy reform dominates the impact of the nuclear power phase-out because the reform covers all sectors of energy consumption, does not only apply to electricity production, and is much broader in scope. The overall reduction in energy use achieved in 2035 by non-OECD countries corresponds to the volume of energy currently consumed by the entire Chinese power sector alone, that is to say 1 100 Mtoe. Globally, the combined policies help save about 750 Mtoe of fossil fuel energy, which is equivalent to the total primary energy currently consumed in Russia.
Macro-economic impacts
The changes in (relative) fossil fuel prices induce sizeable changes in fuel demand by all sectors, which in turn affect the sectoral value-added. Energy intensive industries and power utilities are expectedly sensitive to these transformations. The value-added changes for these industries are depicted in Fig. 3 .
The nuclear share of global electricity generation diminishes from about 10 % in the Baseline in 2035 to 6 % in 2035 in the phase-out scenarios. As a sizable number of nuclear power plants have not reached the end of their technical lifetime by 2035, the phase-out policy has only lead to a very partial elimination of nuclear energy by that date. The decline of nuclear energy is most distinct in Japan and South Korea, where the decrease is almost three-fold and in the European Union where the share of nuclear power is almost halved. In 2035, the total reduction in nuclear activity due to the phasing-out policy accounts for about USD 120 billion of value-added (i.e. about half of global nuclear industry value), two-thirds of it occurring in OECD countries (Fig. 4) . The nuclear phase out scenario exhibits a cumulative loss to 2035 in nuclear value-added of USD 1 trillion worldwide. This loss of nuclear activity is largely transferred to fossil fuel-based electricity generation, which grows by USD 80 billion in the absence of environmental constraints. Fossil fuel electricity generation also appears quite sensitive to the reformed levels of fossil fuel subsidisation, predominantly in countries where they are the highest, such as Middle-East countries and Russia. Conventional electricity generation in these two regions encompasses more than a USD 40 billion reduction in value-added in 2020. This reduction more than doubles in 2035, accounting for almost 90 % of the overall activity decline in this sector. Only fossil fuel subsidies removal incurs a slight decrease in the value of nuclear-generated electricity as there is very limited scope for nuclear energy to expand beyond Baseline figures.
Fossil fuel subsidy reform percolates throughout the entire economy by reallocating primary factors (i.e. capital and labour) across all sectors and particularly across energy intensive industries. It improves the overall efficiency of resource allocation and makes fossil fuel energy cheaper to most OECD countries, especially European countries. Subsidy reform in non-OECD countries leads to more expensive energy and a slight contraction of their energy intensive activities by 2020. In the longer run, fast economic development and a growing demand for iron, steel, cement and chemicals stimulates production activity in China and India. This translates into a net increase of value-added created by energy intensive industries of more than USD 20 billion in 2035. In the long run, only large energy exporters, such as Middle-Eastern countries and to a lesser extent Russia, see their industrial activities negatively affected by fossil fuel subsidy reform. In those countries, a lower contribution of nuclear power to the generation mix hardly affects the activity levels of energy intensive industries, as the switch from nuclear energy to fossil fuels has little impact on energy prices faced by end-users.
The two policies analyzed in this section, be they combined or not, would have limited impacts on global GDP because expenditures on electricity from nuclear power and fossil fuel subsidies are small in comparison with spending on other goods and services (See Supplementary material for details).
4 Interaction between fossil fuel subsidy reform, nuclear power phase-out and climate policy
Assumptions
Illustrative climate policy scenarios provide further insights into the interactions between climate policies and the combined fossil fuel subsidy reform and nuclear power phase-out. A tax is applied to CO 2 emissions from the electricity sector and energy-intensive industries of OECD countries and China, where nuclear power phase-out has the most sizeable implications and where various carbon pricing initiatives are currently underway. The assumed carbon price follows a linearly rising trend starting from USD 0.0 in 2012 to USD 100 per tonne CO 2 in 2035 (or starts from existing levels in the European Union, Australia and New Zealand and converges to the linear trend). In China, it is assumed to rise linearly to reach USD 50 per tonne in 2035. Households are excluded from the taxation regime. This carbon policy simulation is purely illustrative and does not reflect a view on actual or proposed policies by countries. Since the policies combined in this analysis are energy-specific, we restrict the modelled climate policies to the mitigation of CO 2 emissions stemming from energy use.
Impact on the energy system
Imposing a price on CO 2 from fossil fuel combustion alters the energy mix and increases the price of fossil fuels for energy transformation industries and ultimately for end consumers, thereby creating the adequate incentives to reduce global energy demand. The USD 100 per tonne carbon tax faced by OECD countries in 2035 induces an increase in the share of renewable energy in the electricity mix from 28 to 55 %, relative to the Baseline. In this case, the pace of renewables deployment is comparable to the IEA 450 scenario patterns for the power generation sector (IEA 2012). Nuclear power phase-out increases this share by another three percentage points in OECD countries.
The impact of the fossil fuel subsidy reform in non-OECD countries has a wider impact on their fossil fuel energy use than the sole implementation of the carbon tax which, in this scenario, only affects China. The Supplementary Material provides detailed regional outcomes on energy trade patterns in the climate scenarios.
4.3 Impact on CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion 5 Globally, the multilateral fossil fuel subsidy reform helps cut CO 2 emissions by almost 5 % in 2020 and 6.5 % in 2035 relative to the Baseline, even in the absence of carbon pricing (Fig. 5) . When nuclear energy is progressively phased-out, CO 2 emissions exceed Baseline levels in 2035 by 1.6 % (+0.8 GtCO 2 ) as a result of intensified fossil fuel burning. Combining these policies finally translates into a 4.9 % reduction in global CO 2 emissions. The introduction of carbon pricing remains the most effective way to discourage intensive fossil fuel burning: this sole policy leads to a 15 % (−6.9 GtCO 2 ) reduction in CO 2 emissions. Adding the implementation of fossil fuel subsidy reform delivers almost 3 GtCO 2 of additional mitigation in 2035. Phasing out nuclear power increases global emissions by +0.5GtCO 2 compared with the sole carbon tax case. With the assumed carbon pricing scheme in place, the benefit of CO 2 emission reduction from fossil fuel subsidy reform outweighs the additional carbon emitted by having less nuclear energy in the mix. With the three policies in place, the 2035 global CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion are almost 10 GtCO 2 lower than in the Baseline, 4.5 GtCO 2 higher than current levels, and most closely in line with a least-cost 550 ppm concentration stabilisation target (IPCC 2007 and OECD 2012) .
OECD countries show similar emission reductions in 2035 when only a carbon tax regime is implemented, and when it goes hand in hand with less reliance on nuclear energy (See Supplementary material for detailed regional data). In both cases the United States and the European Union reduce their total emissions by respectively almost 30 % (−1.5 GtCO 2 ) and 25 % (−0.9 GtCO 2 ). This highlights how fossil fuel prices endogenously adjust to carbon charges to steer fossil energy demand. Since the carbon price is fixed in both policy simulations, fossil fuel and nuclear electricity prices are the only adjusting variables. The introduction of a carbon price reduces fossil fuel prices (and resource revenues for exporting countries) and increases domestic energy prices (and tax revenues for governments). Naturally, other price adjustments in non-energy primary factors and goods occur simultaneously in a general equilibrium setting. Nuclear phase-out tends to push fossil fuel demand up, and fossil fuel prices with it. Indeed, even fostered-subsidized-renewable-energy-based electricity generation cannot fully compensate for the reduction in nuclear power supply. Interestingly, in the nuclear power phase-out case, fossil fuel prices (excl. the carbon tax) increase enough to eventually discourage extra fossil fuel demand, thus returning some rent from the nuclear industry back to fossil fuel exporters.
Furthermore, this analysis confirms the pivotal role of China in curbing global emissions and the effectiveness of carbon pricing policies in this country. A USD 17.00 tax per ton of CO 2 in 2020, covering the power sector and industries, is sufficient to drive Chinese emissions down by 1.4 GtCO 2 . However, combining an economy-wide reform of support to fossil fuel consumption with carbon pricing in non-OECD countries allows for almost a doubling of their emissions reduction in 2020 compared with carbon pricing alone. In this stylised carbon tax scenario, carbon leakage to countries that do not implement carbon pricing policies, including Russia and India, remains very limited.
Macro-economic impacts
The introduction of a climate policy entails significant changes in relative prices of energy, capital and labour and thus translates into deeper consequences for the entire economy. In OECD countries and China, where carbon pricing is introduced, the GDP and household real (-3 . 0 GtCO2 consumption are negatively affected as (future) environmental benefits from reduced climate change damages are not factored in. Fossil fuel subsidy reform restores efficient use of resources and benefits most countries. Carbon tax implementation prevails and leads to domestic GDP losses in the amount of 0.5-1 % (Fig. 6 )-however these losses reflect only the costs of the carbon tax policy, and not the economic or environmental benefits of reducing climate impacts. The simultaneous effects of all joint policies in China do not significantly alter the economic burden compared with carbon pricing alone. However, a carbon tax implemented in OECD countries and China doubles the economic losses in Russia. Combining a climate policy and an effective fossil fuel subsidy reform brings about multiple benefits to OECD countries: reduced energy bills and achievement of climate change mitigation at slightly lower costs. As India, Indonesia and Middle-East countries are absent from the carbon tax scheme, setting up their own climate regime boosts GDP: they benefit from an improved competitive edge over countries that do implement carbon pricing. India and Indonesia experience a GDP increase of 2.5-3.5 %. Households also face relative price changes indirectly and modify their own consumption patterns. The qualitative direction of country effects is comparable to GDP deviations but the magnitude is slightly larger.
Concluding remarks
This paper aims to identify the channels of interactions between i) a reform of schemes that support the wasteful consumption of fossil fuel resources, ii) a progressive nuclear phase-out and iii) a climate policy. According to this analysis, in a Baseline context without climate policy, progressively reducing the reliance on nuclear energy produces a notable increase in coal and natural gas consumption and hence an increase in CO 2 emissions (amounting to just over 1.5 % of global emissions). Appropriate policy measures could therefore be needed if countries wish to avoid larger switches towards cheaper fossil fuel energy and to address energy security concerns. The phase-out scenario projects a nuclear capacity that is halved by 2035 as compared with the Baseline, equivalent to value-added losses of USD 120 billion in the nuclear industry for that year. The global, cumulative loss to 2035 in nuclear value-added of a progressive nuclear phaseout is USD 1 trillion. In the absence of environmental constraints, lower nuclear activity is compensated by higher fossil fuel-based generating capacity, which represents an extra valueadded of USD 80 billion worldwide. Nuclear power phase-out leaves GDP and real household consumption marginally affected in energy importing countries. In the absence of ambitious climate goals, the reduced reliance on nuclear energy for electricity generation would likely have limited side-effects on international markets of non-energy goods and services.
The analysis shows that a multilateral reform of fossil fuel consumption subsidy is more likely to affect international fossil fuel prices and alter patterns of global energy use. Lower international fossil fuel prices result from decreased demand in large developing countries due to the reform. Energy importers are encouraged to increase their consumption of coal and natural gas, particularly Japan and South Korea, the European Union and China. Energy intensive industries, chiefly in fast growing economies, benefit the most from cheaper fossil fuel prices.
While nuclear power phase-out increases electricity prices and leads to a decrease in household consumption in countries such as Japan, South Korea and the European Union, the fossil fuel subsidy reform leads to an increase in global GDP and a decrease in CO 2 emissions. When jointly implemented, the combined policies lead to an increase in global GDP of similar size to the stand-alone fossil fuel subsidy reform, and a reduction of CO 2 emissions that is somewhat smaller. The combined policies help save a significant amount of primary energy, equivalent to that currently consumed in Russia. Removing the nuclear option from the energy mix would have undesirable consequences on CO 2 emissions unless countervailing measures are added to the policy mix. Globally, fossil fuel subsidy reform can help alleviate further switching towards fossil fuels through market adjustments but it falls short of creating enough incentives to drastically curb emissions. Climate policy instruments such as effective carbon pricing are necessary to meet ambitious climate goals. The illustrative climate scenario confirms that both fossil fuel subsidy reform and nuclear energy can reduce certain negative macro-economic impacts appreciably while also allowing for significant emission reductions.
Disclaimer The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the OECD or of its member countries.
